THE LEGISLATURE HAD AND HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ENACT OR CREATE THE RCW 13.34.040 DEPENDENCY STATUTE!!!!

Part 2

(courtesy of Luis Ewing)

 THE LEGISLATURE HAD AND HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ENACT OR CREATE THE RCW 13.34.040 DEPENDENCY STATUTE!!!!

It is, of course, fundamental that no county or other municipal corporation, through action of its governing body, can make a law which is in conflict with general law as enacted by the legislature. See Article XI, § 11, of the Washington constitution; also, Miller v. Spokane, 35 Wn.2d 113, 211 P.2d 165 (1949), and Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 356 P.2d 292 (1960).

THE LEGISLATURE HAD AND HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ENACT OR CREATE THE RCW 13.34.180 (1) TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTE!!!!

It is, of course, fundamental that no county or other municipal corporation, through action of its governing body, can make a law which is in conflict with general law as enacted by the legislature. See Article XI, § 11, of the Washington constitution; also, Miller v. Spokane, 35 Wn.2d 113, 211 P.2d 165 (1949), and Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 356 P.2d 292 (1960).


IT IS UNDISPUTED PURSUANT TO CR 8 (d) THAT ALL . . . “RCW 13.34.040 DEPENDENCY PETITIONS” . . . VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, § 1 OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE . . .

““JUDICIAL POWER OF THE STATE SHALL BE VESTED IN A SUPREME COURT, . . .” AND NOT IN A MERE CORPORATION THAT EMPLOYS CPS SOCIAL WORKERS AND GUARDIAN AD LITEMS TO SIGN AND FILE FORGED AND PERJURED LEGAL DOCUMENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMMITTING THE FELONY CRIMES OF KIDNAPING, CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE, CHILD STEALING, CHILD SELLING, LEADING
ORGANIZED CRIME, EXTORTION, MONEY LAUNDERING, ETC.

IT IS UNDISPUTED PURSUANT TO CR 8 (d) THAT ALL . . . “RCW 13.34.180 (1) TERMINATION PETITIONS” . . . VIOLATE ARTICLE IV, § 1 OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE . . . ““JUDICIAL POWER OF THE STATE SHALL BE VESTED IN A SUPREME COURT, . . .” AND NOT IN A MERE CORPORATION THAT EMPLOYS CPS SOCIAL WORKERS AND GUARDIAN AD LITEMS TO SIGN AND FILE FORGED AND PERJURED LEGAL DOCUMENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMMITTING THE FELONY CRIMES OF KIDNAPING, CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE, CHILD STEALING, CHILD SELLING, LEADING ORGANIZED CRIME, EXTORTION, MONEY LAUNDERING, ETC.

“Legislatures may delegate power to executive or administrative officials to determine the details of, and to establish rules for the execution of a general legislative plan. U.S. v. Rock Royal Cooperative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Chas. Uhden, Inc. v. Greenough, 181 Wash. 412, 43 P.2d 983, 98 A.L.R. 1181 (1935); Senior Citizen’s League v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn.2d 142, 153, 228 P.2d 478 (1951); Home Owner’s Loan Corp. v. Rawson, 196 Wash. 548, 559, 83 P.2d 765; State v. Gilroy, 37 Wn.2d 41, 45, 221 P.2d 549; State v. Miles, 5 Wn.2d 322, 325, 105 P.2d 51 (1940). But the legislature must state its purpose, and establish standards by which the purpose is to be achieved, so that the limits of the power delegated are clear.

“. . . the delegation of legislative power is justified and constitutional, and the requirements of the standards doctrine are satisfied, when it can be shown (1) that the legislature has provided standards or guidelines which define in general terms what is to be done and the instrumentality or administrative body which is to accomplish it; and (2) that procedural safeguards exist to control arbitrary administrative action and any administrative abuse of discretionary power. . . .” Barry & Barry v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wn.2d 155, 500 P.2d 540 (1972)

“Legislatures my confer upon other bodies the power to determine the existence of facts upon which the application of facts upon which the application of the legislative acts is made to depend. Again it is essential that the legislature establish the standard by which the fact finding body is to be guided. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837, 79 L.Ed. 157; Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wn.2d 380, 297, 119 P.2d 302 (1941); Senior Citizen’s League v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn.2d 142, 153, 228 P.2d 478 (1951); State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 195 Wash. 636, 643, 82 P.2d 120

It is a well understood principle that an agency may not legislate under the guise of its rule making power, and that its rules must be written within the framework and policy of the applicable statute. Agency rules may not amend or change an enactment of the legislature. Kitsap-Mason Dairymen v. Tax Comm’n, 77 Wn.2d 812, 467 P.2d 312 (1970). See also State ex rel West v. Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 94, 309 P.2d 751 (1957); and Juanita Bay Valley Com. v. Kirkland, 9 Wn.App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973).

“There is no authority to delegate acts discretionary or quasi-judicial in nature; an administrative board” such as the CPS Division of DSHS “cannot” legally confer upon its Employees “authority that under the law may be exercised only by the” . . . duly elected County Prosecutor. Schechter v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. App.2d 391, 65 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1968). See also Bagley v. Manhatten Beach, 18 Cal.3d 22, 553 P.2d 1140, 1141, 132 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1976).

THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE IS A STATE AGENCY CREATED BY THE LEGISLATURE. 

“As such it enjoys only those powers expressly conferred by statute or necessarily implied in furtherance of its statutorily defined duties.” Human Right’s Comm’n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wn.2d 118, 125, 641 P.2d 163 (1982).

THE ELECTED COUNTY PROSECUTOR HAD AND HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DELEGATE HIS DISCRETIONARY DUTIES TO INITIATE AND PROSECUTE ALL CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTIONS TO CPS SOCIAL WORKERS OR GUARDIAN AD LITEMS WHO ARE NOT DULY QUALIFIED LICENSED  ATTORNEYS FOR WHOM HE HAS APPOINTED TO THE POSITION OF DEPUTY OR SPECIAL PROSECUTORS!!!!

A specific application of this rule is the well settled principle that a public administrative body to which discretionary functions have been delegated cannot redelegate such functions, absent express authorization. Noe v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. 15, 83 Wn.2d 97, 515 P.2d 977 (1973); State ex rel. School Dist. 301 v. Clausen, 109 Wash. 37, 186 P. 319 (1919); Howard v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. 10, 88 Wash. 167, 152 P. 1004 (1915); McGilvra v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 113 Wash. 619, 194 P. 817 (1921); American Fed’n of Teachers Local 1485 v. Yakima School Dist. 7, 74 Wn.2d 865 (1968); Seattle High School Ch. 200 v. Sharples, 159 Wash. 424 (1930); Juntilla v. Everett School District, 178 Wash. 637, 35 P.2d 78 (1934); Ledgering v. State, 63 Wn.2d 94, 385 P.2d 522 (1963); Roehl v. Public Util. Dist. 1, 43 Wn.2d 214, 251 P.2d 92 (1953); Mulkilteo Education Association v. Mukilteo School District, 11 Wn.App. 75, 524 P.2d 441 (1974).

THE PROSECUTOR HAS BEEN DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO REDELEGATE HIS AUTHORITY ONLY TO DEPUTY PROSECUTORS AND SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PURSUANT TO RCW 36.27.010, RCW 36.27.020, RCW 36.27.030 AND RCW 36.27.040 AND THE FOLLOWING CRR 1.1 DECISIONAL LAWS OF THIS STATE:

“The legislature has enacted RCW 36.27.010 and .040, which require that a prosecuting attorney and his deputies qualify and limit be regularly admitted attorneys at law, which provisions, in turn, the general authority to employ deputies extended to a prosecuting attorney, as a county elective official, by 36.16.07. ...FINLEY, STAFFORD, WRIGHT, UTTER, and BRACHTENBACK, JJ., concur. HALE, C.J. (Concurring only in the result)–At the time this appeal was heard, the statute prescribed that no one not a member of the bar of this court could serve as prosecuting attorney: No person shall be eligible to the office of the office of prosecuting attorney in any county of this state, unless he is a qualified elector therein, and has been admitted as an attorney and counselor of the courts of this state. RCW 36.27.010 Deputy prosecuting attorneys were given the same power and authority as the prosecuting attorney and were required to be members of the bar in a statute declaring that “Each deputy thus appointed shall have the same qualifications required of the prosecuting attorney.” RCW 36.27.040. Because the prosecuting attorney and his deputies hold offices created by the constitution, they are in law public officials. Const. Art. 11, section 5. Since the prosecuting attorney and his deputies hold “public offices” and their qualifications are prescribed by statute under the constitution, it follows that the courts are and should be without power to either abrogate or enhance the power and authority of prosecuting attorneys and their deputies, or to establish other and different public offices with either the authority or power to fullfill the functions of prosecuting attorneys and deputy prosecuting attorneys. Accordingly, this court cannot, within the lawful exercise of its judicial power, create the office of prosecuting attorney, or one like it, nor can it authorize such office to be filled by persons who do NOT possess the qualifications prescribed by statute for that office. I would therefore, reject the rationale of the majority opinion and hold that the statute requiring that prosecuting attorneys and their deputies must be members of the bar be upheld and that this court is without power to prescribe lesser qualifications or to otherwise amend suchstatutes.” STATE v. COOK, 84 Wn.2d 342, 348, 352, 525 P.2d 761 (August 1974). And;

“Appointment of the Special Prosecutor

RCW 36.27.030 enables a superior court to appoint a special prosecutor when the elected prosecutor is under a disability which prevents him form performing his responsibilities in a certain case. . . . [14] A court can only appoint a special prosecuting attorney in instances where a statute provides for such an appointment. Hoppe v. King Cy., 95 Wn.2d 332, 339, 622 P.2d 845 (1980); State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59, 62, 56 P. 843 (1899). RCW 36.27.030 provides: Disability of prosecuting attorney. When from illness or other cause the prosecuting attorney is temporarily unable to perform his [or her] duties, the court or judge may appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties of such officer in court until the disability is removed. Under Hoppe, a prosecutor must have both a duty to represent an official act and a disability that prevents the prosecutor from representing the official before the appointment of a special prosecutor is justified. The prosecutor’s duties are enumerated in RCW 36.27.020, which provides: The prosecuting attorney shall: . . . (4) Prosecute all criminal and civil actions in which the state or the county may be a party, defend all suits brought against the state or county, ... Specifically RCW 36.27.030 provides: When any prosecuting attorney fails, from sickness or other cause, to attend a session of the superior court of his [or her] county, or is unable to perform his [or her] duties at such session, the court or judge may appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties of such session, and the appointee shall receive a compensation to be fixed by the court, to be deducted from the stated salary of the prosecuting attorney, not exceeding, however, one-fourth of the quarterly salary of the prosecuting attorney.” WESTERMAN v. CARY, 125 Wn.2d 277, 892 P.2d 1067 [No. 60383-9. En Banc. November 22, 1994.] And;

As you can see above RCW 36.27.010, RCW 36.27.020, RCW 36.27.030 and RCW 36.27.040 requires Deputy prosecuting attorneys shall have the same qualifications required of the prosecuting attorney,THAT MEANS THEY HAVE TO BE DULY QUALIFIED LICENSED ATTORNEYS!!!!

CPS SOCIAL WORKERS ARE NOT LICENSED ATTORNEYS!!!!!

GUARDIAN AD LITEMS ARE NOT LICENSED ATTORNEYS!!!!

THE CRIMINALLY CORRUPT FAMILY COURT JUDGES AND THE CRIMINALLY CORRUPT FAMILY COURT JUDGES ARE LEADING ORGANIZED CRIME BY ALLOWING THESE UNQUALIFIED AND UNLICENSED CPS SOCIAL WORKERS TO PLAY ATTORNEY AND PRACTICE LAW IN ALL THE FAMILY COURTS.

“The courts have consistently held that a public body may not redelegate its powers unless they are administrative or ministerial as opposed to discretionary.” Bunger v. Iowa High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 197 N.W.2nd 555 (Iowa 1972).

This means the CPS Social Workers and Guardian Ad Litems can get a job as a Clerk or a Receptionist or any other administrative or ministerial duty, but they cannot engaged in any “discretionary” functions such as Initiating Executive Process unless they want to be charged with Unauthorized Practice of Law.

In the leading case of In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910), the court said that:

“The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a limited and dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and confidence. It cannot be delegated without consent, and it cannot exist between an attorney employed by a corporation to practice law for it, and a client of a corporation, for he would be subject to the directions of the corporation, and not to the directions of the client.” In re Cooperative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).

“A statute authorizing the formation of corporations to carry on any lawful business does not include the work of the learned professions [such as practicing law]. Such an innovation with the evil results that might follow, would require the use of specific language clearly indicating the intention. The reasons lie deeper than lack of statutory sanction for it. Human personal qualifications for such professions cannot be possessed by a corporation [such as the CPS Division of DSHS]. They would inhere in the members as distinct from the corporation, and it could not have the power to do illegally an act requiring a license which only they could obtain.” Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm. Ed.) chapter 5, § 97, at page 339. And;

“A corporation being an impersonal, artificial entity existing only by virtue of the law can not be subject to the personal discipline and qualifications required of natural beings for a professional life. People v. Woodbury (1908) 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697; Hannon v. Siegel Cooper Co. (1901) 167 N. Y. 244, 60 N. E. 597. The legislature in its general law authorizing the creation of corporations to carry on "any lawful business" did not intend to include the work of the learned professions. (1913) 22 Yale Law Journal 590. . . . In the legal profession it is flatly laid down both by the courts and by statute that a corporation can neither practice law nor hire lawyers to carry on the business of practicing law. (Harker's Illinois Statutes Annot. Chap. 32, par. 362, p. 1160); (N. Y. Law Chap. 484 Law 1909); In re Co-operative Law Co. (1910) 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15; In re Association of Lawyers (1908), 119 N. Y. S. 77; L. Meisel & Co. v. National Jewelers Board of Trade (1915) 90 N. Y. Misc. 19, 152, N. Y. S. 913; Buxton v. Lietz (1912) 136 N. Y. S. 829 (affirmed 139 N. Y. S. 46); 2 R. C. L. 946; 32 L. R. A (N. S.) n55; State ex. rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corporation (1919) 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694. The "practice of law" is not limited to the conduct of cases in courts. It includes legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments — the mere fact that the instrument is in printed form does not change its character and give license for any one to fill in the blanks — collecting claims, conveyances, wills, and the drawing of any contract by which the legal rights of parties are secured; although such matters may or may not be pending in the courts. L. Meisel & Co. v. National Jewelers Board of Trade, supra. It seems clear then that the term "practice of law" includes more within its field than the term "practice of medicine" or the other professions. Therefore, the same theory that supports a corporation of licensed physicians in its pursuit of the "practice of medicine" will not aid a corporation composed of attorneys in their attempt to- 

"practice law". The instant case is a striking example of an attempt upon the part of a corporate organization to invade the legal profession. Situations of this nature are all too prevalent. Although the corporations do not appear as attorneys of record, yet they are the real masters in the nature of Banks, Title Companies, Collecting Agencies, Insurance Claim Departments, and Corporate Charter Companies. The lawyer is a mere agent under the control and direction of these invisible powers.” Illinois Law Quarterly, Volume 4, page 143.

Therefore, since the CPS Division of DSHS is a mere corporation, it cannot engage in the practice of law through unqualified and unlicensed CPS Social Workers!

It is undisputed pursuant to CR 8 (d) that the CPS Division of DSHS is a mere Corporation!!!!

The Washington State Supreme Court held n State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919), that a corporation could not engage in the practice of law profession through licensed agents!

It is undisputed pursuant to CR 8 (d) that CPS Social Workers are NOT licensed attorneys!

DO CPS SOCIAL WORKERS HAVE ANY KIND OF A BUSINESS LICENSE????

DO GUARDIAN AD LITEMS HAVE ANY KIND OF A BUSINESS LICENSE????

In the legal profession it is flatly laid down both by the courts and by statute that a corporation such as the CPS Division of DSHS can neither practice law nor hire lawyers to carry on the business of practicing law. (Harker's Illinois Statutes Annot. Chap. 32, par. 362, p. 1160); (N. Y. Law Chap. 484 Law 1909); Midland Adjustment Credit Adjustment Company et all v. Donnelly, 219 Ill. A. 271 (1921); In re Cooperative Law Company, 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); In re Association of Lawyers, 119 N.Y.S. 77, L. Meisel & Company v. National Jewelers Board of Trade, 90 N.Y. Misc. 19, 152 N.Y.S. 913 (1915); Buxton v. Lietz, 136 N.Y.S. 829, (affirmed 139 N.Y.S. 46); 2 RCL 946; 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) n. 55; 73 A.L.R. 1327; 105 A.L.R. 1364; People ex rel. Lawyers Institute of San Diego v. Merchants Protective Ass’n, 189 Cal. 351, 209 Pac. 363 (1922); State ex rel. Boynton v. Perkins, 138 Kan. 899, 28 P. (2d) 765 (1934); State ex rel. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo 845, 74 S.W. (2d) 348 (1934) (leading case in Missouri); The Bar Association of St. Louis v. H. Pagels d. b. a. Mutual Adjustment Co. (St. Louis Cct. Ct., Mo. 1935) No. 2632-C, Div. No. 2 (layman who solicited claims and threatened suit as a collection firm held engaged in unlawful practice of law); Van Hee v. Kauffman (St. Louis Cct. Ct., Mo. 1935) No. 211420 Div. No. 3.

Therefore, since the Office of Guardian Ad Litems is a mere corporation, it cannot engage in the practice of law through unqualified and licensed and just as Guardian Ad Litems!

The CrR 1.1 Decisional laws of Washington has consistently held to the above reasoning in State ex rel. Lundin v. Merchants Protective Association, 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 and State ex rel. Standard Optical Company v. Superior Court, 17 Wn.2d 323, 135 P.2d 839, which latter case quotes at p. 331 from Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419 as follows:

“If such a course were sanctioned the logical result would be that corporations and business partnerships might practice law, medicine, dentistry or any other profession by the simple expedient or employing licensed agents. And if this were permitted professional standards would be practically destroyed, and professions requiring special training were commercialized, to the public detriment. The ethics of any profession is based upon personal and individual responsibility. One who practices a profession is responsible directly to his patient or his client. Hence he cannot properly act in the practice of his vocation as an agent or a corporation or business partnership whose interests is in the very nature of the case are commercial in nature.” Ezell v. Ritholz, 188 S.C. 39, 198 S.E. 419. And; 

If a corporation were formed for the purpose of practicing one of the learned professions, as shown by its articles of incorporation which must set forth the purpose of the corporation, it would be the duty of the Secretary of State to refuse to file such articles. RCW 23.01.050 provides in part, that:

“. . . if the Secretary of State finds that the articles of incorporation conform to law he shall put an endorsement of his approval upon each set, and . . . he shall file one of such sets of articles in his office, . . .”

Concerning the duty of the Secretary of State, our court said in State ex rel. Gorman v. Nichols, 40 Wash. 437, 82 Pac. 743 (1905) that:

“. . . the secretary of state was under no duty to file articles not entitled to be filed, and that this court will not compel him to do a vain or illegal act.” State ex rel. Gorman v. Nichols, 40 Wash. 437, 82 Pac. 743 (1905).

“While the delegation of legislative power must be circumscribed by guiding standards, details and specifics may be determined by the body to which the power is delegated. “[T]he complexity of the subject matter of legislation, and its character as an exercise of police power or otherwise, are to be taken into consideration in determining whether there has been an unlawful delegation of legislative power.” Senior Citizen’s League v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn.2d 142, 153, 228 P.2d 478 (1951); Vail v. Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922); McMillan v. Sims, 132 Wash. 265, 231 Pac. 943 (1925); State v. Nelson, 146 Wash. 17, 261 Pac. 796 (1927); State v. Miles, 5 Wn.2d 142, 153, 228 P.2d 478 (1951). Cited as support for this rule of common sense and practicality is Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wn.2d 380, 397, 119 P.2d 302 (1941).

"It will be noticed that the Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses., p.187 (Rem. 1927 Sup., section 13-2), provides that, "Sec. 2. When and as the rules of courts herein authorized shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force or effect." STATE EX REL. FOSTERWYMAN LUM. CO. v. SUP'R CT., 148 Wash. 1, 13, [No. 21107. En Banc. May 29th, 1928.] And;

"It will be noticed that the Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses., p.187 (Rem. 1927 Sup., section 13-2), provides that, "Sec. 2. When and as the rules of courts herein authorized shall be promulgated all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force or effect." STATE EX REL. FOSTERWYMAN LUM. CO. v. SUP'R CT., 148 Wash. 1, 13, [No. 21107. En Banc. May 29th, 1928.] And;

IT IS THEREFORE UNDISPUTED PURSUANT TO CR 8 (d) THAT ONLY THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT CAN PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS REGARDING THE PRACTICE OF LAW!!!!

"[1-3] There are several grounds which justify our rule. First, the legislature has authorized the Supreme court to adopt rules of procedure. RCW 2.04.190: "The supreme court shall have the power to prescribe ... the forms of all writs and all other process ... Quite apart from the statutory authority, this court has the inherent power to govern court procedures. State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928). This stems from the constitutional provision that all judicial power of the state is vested in the Supreme Court and various other courts designated in the constitution. Const. art. 4, section 1." STATE v. FIELDS, 85 Wn.2d 126, 128, 129, 530 P.2d 284 [No. 43278. En Banc. January 10, 1975.1 And;

IT IS THEREFORE UNDISPUTED PURSUANT TO CR 8 (d) THAT ONLY . . . A DULY LICENSED ATTORNEY . . . OR . . . A TRIBAL LAWYER . . . CAN ENGAGE IN FULL PRACTICE OF LAW!!!!

IT IS FURTHER UNDISPUTED PURSUANT TO CR 8 (d) THAT ONLY . . . A DULY QUALIFIED APR RULE 9 LEGAL INTERN . . . OR . . . A REAL ESTATE AGENT . . . OR . . . A REAL ESTATE BROKER . . . OR . . . A ESCROW OFFICER . . . WHO IS . . . A DULY QUALIFIED RULE 12 LIMITED PRACTICE OFFICER . . . CAN ENGAGE IN THE LIMITED PRACTICE OF LAW IN ALL COURTS!!!!

APR RULE 9 LEGAL INTERNS:

http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&set=APR&ruleid=gaapr09

APR RULE 12 LIMITED PRACTICE OFFICERS:

http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&set=APR&ruleid=gaapr12

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAS PROMULGATED TWO (2) RULES THAT ALLOWS ANY PERSON WHO QUALIFIES TO ENGAGED IN LIMITED PRACTICE OF LAW UNDER APR RULE 9 FOR LEGAL INTERNS AND APR RULE 12 FOR LIMITED PRACTICE OFFICERS!!!!

IT IS UNDISPUTED PURSUANT TO CR 8 (d) THAT COURT RULES SUPERCEDE THE STATUTES!!!!

APR RULE 9 LEGAL INTERNS . . . “SUPERCEDES” . . . THE DEPENDENCY STATUTES!!!!

APR RULE 9 LEGAL INTERNS . . . “SUPERCEDES” . . . THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES!!!!

APR RULE 9 LEGAL INTERNS HAS STANDARDS!!!!

THE DEPENDENCY STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO STANDARDS!!!!

THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO STANDARDS!!!!

Everyone needs to start researching and pulling the case law that says that . . . “STATUTES THAT HAVE NO STANDARDS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL” . . . and please send me a list of any case cites you come up with to <rcwcodebuster@aol.com> or <rcwcodebuster@yahoo.com> or <rcwcodebuster@live.com or <rcwcodebuster@mail.com> or <rcwcodebuster@gmail.com> 

I just discovered these new arguments to use against CPS and have not yet had time to fully research this out yet, but this is so important to all those fighting CPS, I just had to let it out!

THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS STATUTES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO STANDARDS!!!!

IT IS UNDISPUTED PURSUANT TO CR 8 (d) THAT . . . ALL CPS SOCIAL WORKERS . . . AND . . . ALL GUARDIAN AD LITEMS . . . ARE THEREFORE COMMITTING . . . “UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.”

“It is essential to the administration of justice and the proper protection of society that unlicensed persons be not permitted to prey upon the public by engaging in the practice of law.” Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937). See also Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1947) and State ex rel. Hunter v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380 (1937). And;

It is undisputed pursuant to CR 8 (d) that in Hagan v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 443 (1982), that the Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier ruling in Bar Association v. Great Western Federal, 91 Wn.2d 48, 586 P.2d 870 (1978), that:

“. . . the selection and completion of form legal documents [such as Dependency Petitions or Termination Petitions], or the drafting of such documents, including deeds, mortgages, deeds of trust, promissory notes and agreements modifying these documents constitutes the practice of law.” Hagan Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 443 (1982); 2 R.C.L., p. 938, § 4. See also APR 9 & APR 12. And;

It seems fair to say that something which can lawfully be done only by an attorney admitted to practice is in fact and in law the “Practice of Law.” State v. Chamberlain, 132 Wash. 520, 232 Pac. 337 (1925). 

Moreover, on the basis of the Court’s decision in the Kassler Escrow case, that now must be deemed to be so even in the face of an act of the legislature creating RCW 13.34.040 Dependency Statute and RCW 13.34.180 (1) Termination of Parental Rights Statute purporting to authorize illegal conduct by unqualified, untrained & unlicensed CPS Workers!

Everyone who is fighting CPS needs to look at your . . . STATE CONSTITUTION . . . and the . . . PROSECUTOR STATUTES!!!!

You have an absolute . . . CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT . . . to be prosecuted civilly or criminally by “A DULY ELECTED PROSECUTOR” . . . or . . . “DEPUTY PROSECUTOR” . . . or . . . “SPECIAL PROSECUTOR.”

ONLY THE ELECTED COUNTY PROSECUTOR CAN BRING A CRIMINAL OR CIVIL ACTION AGAINST ANYONE IN THIS STATE IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY BOTH STATUTES, CASE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION.

It is undisputed that the . . . “EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY” . . . is vested solely in the office of the elected . . . “PROSECUTING ATTORNEY” . . . or his . . . “DEPUTY PROSECUTOR” . . . or his . . . “SPECIAL PROSECUTOR” . . . by the Washington Constitution Article 11, section 5 and Article 12 and has been codified by the legislature at RCW 36.27.005 and RCW 36.27.020(3) and (4) only.

Both statutes, RCW 13.34.040 the dependency statute and RCW 13.34.180 (1) the termination of parental rights statute, are clearly unconstitutional as they violate the separation of powers doctrine and the Washington state constitution and the prosecutor statutes which provide that the executive authority is vested solely in the office of the prosecutor. Article III, Section 1, Article IV, Section 1, Article XI, Section 5, RCW 36.27.020(4), RCW 43.10.232, pursuant to the case of Lorraine Kirtley v. Diane Frost, Carol Rainey, Michael Stowell, and Does 1-100, Kitsap County District Court No. 980000004; People v. The Municipal Court for the Ventura Judicial District, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645 (1972); In re Petition of Padget, 678 P.2d 870 (Wyo. 1984); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160 (1926).

It is undisputed that RCW 36.27.020 (3)(4) and (6) clearly provides that the Prosecutor shall: . . . (3) Appear for and represent the state, county, . . . in all criminal and civil proceedings in which the state or the county . . . may be a party; . . . and (4) Prosecute all criminal and civil actions in which the state or the county may be a party, . . . and (6) Institute and prosecute proceedings before magistrates whereas RCW 13.34.040 & RCW 13.34.180 (1) provides [n]o such authority, without violating RCW 2.48.180 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. 

It is undisputed that it has long been the rule in this State that the court’s power to appoint a special prosecuting attorney is limited to cases where such an appointment is provided by statute. Bates v. School District No. 10, 45 Wash. 498, 88 Pac. 944 (1907); In re Lewis, 51 Wn.2d 193, 201, 202, 316 P.2d 907 (1957); State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59, 62, 56 Pac. 843 (1899); Ladenburg v. Cambell, 56 Wn.App. 701, 704, 784 P.2d 1306 (1990); Hoppe v. King County, 95 Wn.2d 332, 339, 622 P.2d 845 (1980); Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wn.2d 277, 298 (1994), RCW 36.27.030.

It is undisputed that . . . NO CPS SOCIAL WORKERS . . . or . . . “GUARDIAN AD LITEMS” . . . have been appointed to the position of either . . . “DEPUTY PROSECUTOR’S” . . . or . . . “SPECIAL PROSECUTOR’S” . . . by the Elected Kitsap County Prosecutor Russell Haige as required by RCW 36.27.040 which also requires that said appointment . . . “SHALL BE IN WRITING.”

CPS SOCIAL WORKERS & GUARDIAN AD LITEMS ARE NOT IN FACT AND LAW. . . "DEPUTY PROSECUTORS" . . . AND ARE THEREFORE PRACTICING LAW WITHOUT A LICENSE IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF RCW 2.48.180.